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THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT
AND WOMEN: THE ACHIEVEMENT OF
EQUAL VALUE AND EQUAL EXERCISE OF
AUTONOMY
LISA NAPOLIf
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of informed consent secures and promotes a patient's
control over health care decisions.' The ideological foundation of
informed consent is the preservation of patient autonomy.2 This
essay examines the value of informed consent for women, using
hysterectomy3 as a frame of reference. Since women continue to
occupy a subordinate social status, which compromises their health
and autonomy,4 informed consent could be a valuable tool both for
enhancing women's health status and for advancing women's self-
determination.'
* Lisa Napoli will be a pro se law clerk for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit during the 1996-98 term. She received herJ.D. from the Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law in January 1996.
1. CathyJ. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking. Toward a New
SeyfFulfiUing Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379, 385 (1990) (citation omitted).
2. Id. at 385 n.16. "Autonomy," for the purposes of this essay, means that: "one acts
intentionally, with understanding, and, without controlling influences." RUr P. FADEN, TOM
L. BEAUCHAMP & NANCY M. P. KING, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 34 (1986).
The terms "autonomy," "self-determination," and"self-governance" will be used interchangeably
throughout this work.
3. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICrIONARY 842 (26th ed. 1995).
4. See Lisa M. Krieger, Why Women Face High Rates ofHlV, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 6, 1995, at
A2 (explaining that the World Health Organization finds that "[w ] omen's vulnerability [to HIV
is linked to their low status in society and their economic, cultural, and social dependence on
their male partners").
5. Cf Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in
Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1, 8-29 (1995) (chronicling the history of tort doctrine and how it
mirrors "changing power relations within American society"). See CAROLYN FAULDER, WHOSE
BODY IS IT? THE TROUBLING ISSUE OF INFORMED CONSENT 30 (1985) (stating that it is in a
patient's "best interest" to make their own, informed decision).
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Although patients generally report having poor relationships with
their doctors,6 studies have shown that women patients are consistent-
ly treated worse than men.7 Doctors stereotype women as "emotion-
al, '"8 "passive,"9 and in need of "fixing."1" Such views toward
6. Michael Simpson, Robert Buckman, Moira Stewart, Peter Maguire, Mack Lipkin, Dennis
Novack &James Till, Doctor-Patient Communication: The Toronto Consensus Statement, 303 BRIT. MED.
J. 1385 (1991) (relating that poor doctor-patient communication is common and negatively
affects a patient's care); see How Is Your Doctor Treating You?, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 1995, at 81
(reporting that many patients have unsatisfactory relationships with their doctors). A significant
issue for all patients is that doctors underestimate a patient's capacity to understand medical
information.
I believe a doctor can avoid statistics as much as possible in discussing risks and still
protect himself. You can say, "In a very small number of cases, this or that complica-
tion may occur. I've never had such a complication in my experience, and neither
have any of the other doctors I know. But it is cited in the medical literature on this
operation."
To me, such a statement to the patient makes the situation far clearer than talk
about a "point five percent risk" of something or other, which the Puerto Rican patient
... for instance, certainly isn't going to understand anyway. Nor will the average
housewife or assembly-line worker or whoever.
Jack E. Horsley withJohn H. Lavin, An Up-to-Date Guide to Informed Consent, MED. ECON., Mar. 21,
1977, at 150, 154, quoted in CANDACE WEST, ROUTINE COMPLICATIONS 3 (1984).
7. See KarenJ. Armitage, LawrenceJ. Schneiderman & Robert Bass, Response of Physicians
to Medical Complaints in Men and Women, 241 JAMA 2186 (1979) (explaining a study in which
gender-neutral symptoms were presented by males and females who had been patients at a
group practice for more than five years. The study found that the men's complaints were
treated more seriously than the women's.); see also Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
American Medical Association, GenderDisparities in ClinicalDecision Making, 266JAMA 559 (1991)
[hereinafter Gender Disparities in Clinical Decision Making) (reporting how a patient's gender
affects the treatment a doctor recommends); Mary C. Howell, What Medical Schools Teach About
Women, 291 NEw ENG.J. MED. 304 (1974) (reviewing the discrimination women endure both as
patients and as student physicians); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture
in theForced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REv. 487 (1992) (investigating how
doctors often force unwanted treatment on pregnant women without their consent).
The relationship between doctor and patient is one of asymmetrical power and authority.
This asymmetry is even more pronounced in the relationship between woman patient and
doctor.
American women once predominantly provided health care for each other. During
the nineteenth century, the burgeoning male-dominated medical profession gained
control over the treatment of women. In this transition, women lost the information
and the skills needed to care for their own bodies. Perhaps even more importantly,
they lost the ability to define what was normal and healthy.
As the male medical profession gained dominance, women were conceptualized as
being at the mercy of their reproductive organs and of their rampant emotions - as
sickly and irrational. This view, developed in the nineteenth century, is still reflected
in gynecological texts and medical practices. Increasingly, women's normal mental and
physical processes have been medicalized.
SUE FISHER, IN THE PATIENT'S BEST INTEREST- WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF MEDICAL DECISIONS
30-31 (1986) (citations omitted).
8. See George E. Murphy, The Clinical Management of Hysteria, 247JAMA 2559, 2559 (1982)
(reporting that hysteria is limited to women). Hysteria has since been re-named post-traumatic
stress disorder upon the revelation that men manifest the same syndrome. JUDITH LEWIS
HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE - FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO
POLITICAL TERROR 32 (1992).
9. FISHER, supra note 7, at 157.
Spring 19961 EQUAL EXERCISE OF AUTONOMY
women are reflected in the information given to them, the medical
treatment dispensed, and the form of patient consent obtained."
Informed consent legislation is one option for increasing the amount
of information women receive,'2 but as will be discussed in this essay,
this option does not offer sufficient relief 13  When women turn to
the courts, the legal system perpetuates shared stereotypes of women
and allows doctors' attitudes to go unchecked. 4
10. See FISHER, supra note 7, at 31. Medicine has demonstrated a history of this attitude
toward women:
In 1809 the first ovariectomy was performed, and throughout the nineteenth century
gynecologists vied with each other to develop ever more radical forms of surgical
invasion of the female anatomy. Having discovered the ovariectomy, the surgeons had
to discover more reasons for performing it, so ovaries were routinely removed as a
highly touted remedy for hysteria, psychological disorders, insanity, and even to keep
women under the social control of men. These justifications for the performance of
ovariectomies were used as recently as 19461
ROBERT S. MENDELSOHN, MALE PRACTICE: HoW DOCTORS MANIPULATE WOMEN 30 (1981); see
also France Griggs, Breaking Tradition: Doctor Steps In to Stop Maiming "Surgery of Love, "CHI. TRiB.,
Aug. 25, 1991, at 8 (explaining that this attitude is evidenced even today, as in the case of Dr.
James Burt who performed what he called "love surgery" on women in Ohio for 22 years in an
effort to correct what he believed to be the error of women's natural physiology).
11. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; KarenJ. Armitage, LawrenceJ. Schneiderman
& Robert A. Bass, Response of Physicians to Medical Complaints in Men and Women, 241 JAMA 2186,
2187 (1979) (reporting results of a study which showed that doctors pay a great deal more
attention to male patient complaints than female patient complaints).
12. Some state legislatures have responded to the adverse effects of inadequate informed
consent by legislating specific disclosures of information. See, e.g., Susan G. Nayfield, Gregory
C. Bongiovanni, Marianne Haenlein Alciati, Ruth A. Fischer & Lawrence Bergner, Statutory
Requirement for Disclosures of Breast Cancer Treatment Alternatives, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1202
(1994) (surveying the statutes of 18 states that require physicians to disclose alternative
treatments for breast cancer); Beatrice V. Rose, Informed Consent and Hysterectomy: Enhancing the
Right to Know, 82 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 609 (1992) (summarizing informed consent legislation and
its effect on the performance of hysterectomies).
13. See discussion infra section IV (discussing legislation addressing informed consent,
focusing on New York).
14. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
[I]f all the gory details of a proposed surgery were graphically explained to every
patient and all possible medical maladies that might result were enumerated we doubt
that a lay person would have the stomach to listen to it all; and if the patient did,
would probably be in such a fearful state that no rational decision could be made ....
[I]n order to hold a physician to such a duty "you would have to have the patient take
a medical course in order to perform surgery."
Longmire v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
The standards for determining what information is given to a patient are left to the discretion
of the doctor, with the court allowing "suitable leeway for the physician's situation." Weil v.
Seltzer, 873 F.2d 1453, 1458 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
787 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). Women are often treated as less equal than men by the legal system.
For example, a study of right-to-die cases reveals that appellate courts "generally referred to
[women] by their first names and described [them] as 'emotional,' 'immature,' 'unreflective,'
and 'vulnerable to medical neglect'; in contrast, men are generally referred to by their last
names and described as 'rational,' 'mature,' 'decisive,' and 'subject to medical assault.'" Jane
Green Schaller, The Advancement offWomen in Academic Medicinre 264JAMA 1854, 1854-55 (1990),
quoting from S. Miles & A. August, Court, Gender, and "The Right to Die," 18 LAw MED. & HEALTH
CARE 85, 85-90 (1990) (stating that gender and racial biases still impact the scientific
community). See generally Lois FORER, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND THE
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This essay focuses on hysterectomy because it is controversial: it
involves the excision of the female sex organs, and the balance
between risks and benefits is sharply contested."5 As part of this
procedure, women are desexed, by removal of the uterus, and
castrated, by removal of the ovaries. In thirty-six percent of all cases,
a woman's ovaries are removed.'" There was an equivalent medical
procedure for men (castration is the most successful treatment for
benign prostate hyperplasia), but it was deemed too severe a
procedure for a benign condition and discarded.' 7
Case law, statutes, medical textbooks, and medical and legal
literature were reviewed to illustrate the full scope of the issue of
informed consent The results show that the doctrine of informed
consent, a potentially powerful tool for women's attainment of a
greater measure of societal equality, has been largely ineffective.
I. WOMEN AND MEDICAL CARE
Historically, experiments 8 and operations 9 have been performed
ELDERLY IN COURT 39-44 (1991) (noting that courts treat everyone as if she/he were a
.reasonable white adult male").
15. For instancejust over one-third of all hysterectomies are performed to remove uterine
fibroids, a benign condition. Current medical knowledge, however, suggests that hysterectomy
may be unnecessary to treat uterine fibroids. A University of Iowa College of Medicine study
"found that the potential risks of the surgery outweigh the risks posed by the 'fibroids,' even if
the uterus is larger than that of a 12-week pregnancy." LEADS.. .from The University of Iowa
Health Center, Office of Health Center Information and Communication, Apr. 15, 1992, at 1.
16. Sexual Response After Hysterectomy, HEALTHFACIS, (Center for Medical Consumers, New
York, N.Y.), Dec. 1990, at 2.
17. Ron Winslow, Avoiding the Knfr" Prostate Patients Get Choice of Treatments That Obviate
Surgey, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1990, at Al. Patricia Quintilian makes a comparable point that
women and men are treated dissimilarly in her comment, Unnecessarj Hysterectomy: The Lack of
Informed Consent, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 573,583 n.65 (1983). She contrasts the statistics
for removal of the uterus for uterine cancer with those for removal of the prostate for prostate
cancer;, even though the incidence of both cancers are the same, prostatectomies are never
prophylactically performed, but hysterectomies are routinely prescribed as a preventive measure
against cancer.
18. See BARBARA SEAMAN & GIDEON SEAMAN, WOMEN AND THE CRISIS IN SEX HORMONES(1977). An example of this experimentation and the devaluation of women, except as their
value pertains to reproduction, is the work of Dr.J. Marion Sims, who is "revered as 'the Father
of Gynecology.'" MENDELSOHN, supra note 10, at 33 (discussing Sims' landmark contribution
to the field, the fact that he developed a surgical procedure to remedy vesicovaginal fistulas.
Much of Sims' research was done by repeatedly experimenting on female slaves without
anesthesia. This research originally began after Sims maimed a woman during surgery leaving
her unable to bear children. He finally perfected his technique after operating on her 30 times
without anesthesia.).
Conversely, women are also excluded from clinical trials, thus data pertaining to medical
research is premised on a male model. Gender Disparities in Clinical Decision Making, supra note
7, at 596. Use of the male model compromises women's health. For example, women were
often denied access to AIDS clinical trials. Celia Hooper, Some Drug Trials Show Gender Bias, J.
NAT'L INST. HEALTH RES., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 47. The definition of AIDS did not include the
manifestations of HIV specific to women, such as cervical cancer, until 1992. New AIDS Definition
Will Hdp Prolong Lives, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 9, 1992, at A38. Finally, lesbian women were absent
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on women without their consent. When consent is sought, women
must often overcome gender-based stereotypes that impact on a
doctor's decision to perform a procedure and on the doctor's
disclosure of information concerning that procedure." As a result,
important risks and benefits associated with a woman's options for
care are frequently never revealed.
Women must become equal partners in the decisionmaking process
in order to achieve a more powerful status. Such a change could have
important benefits: (1) improved health status by eliminating
unnecessary procedures," (2) increased well-being through in-
creased autonomy over one's own body,22 (3) decreased health care
costs, 23 and (4) increased societal power for women as their authori-
ty to make important decisions becomes on par with men's authori-
t.24
Hysterectomy is second only to cesarean section as the surgical
procedure most frequently performed in the United States.25 Thus,
from research done by the National Cancer Institute on transmission of the human papillo-
mavirus. Screening for Cervical Cancer Room for Improvement, HEALTHFAcTS (Center for Medical
Consumers, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1990, at 1. Race, gender and sexual orientation are all
fundamental characteristics largely ignored in research.
19. See Helen Rodrfguez-Trias, The Women's Health Movement, in REFORMING MEDICINE 107,
116-23 (Victor W. Sidel & Ruth Sidel eds., 1984) (describing the sterilization campaign in Puerto
Rico where one-third of women of childbearing age were sterilized by 1968, most of whom
believed the process was temporary). This kind of abuse is not confined to gender but intersects
with race, ethnicity and class. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 214-21 (1981).
20. Consider the following case of a 21 year-old woman with a malignant breast lesion
whose doctor told her to have a mastectomy:
Her surgeon.., related... his increasing doubts, as the morning of the surgery drew
closer, about whether to proceed without first disclosing to Iphigenia the availability
of alternative treatments, particularly radiation therapy. He had not spoken to her
about alternatives because he firmly believed that surgery was the best treatment for
her and that all alternatives were inferior.
Only his misgivings about having to perform such a mutilating procedure on a
person that young and attractive led him to consider telling her about alternative
treatments ....
JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 90-91 (1984) (emphasis added).
21. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2495 (McKinney 1993) (enacting informed consent
legislation to combat the hysterectomy rate).
22. GEORGEJ. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 83-84 (2d ed. 1992).
23. "Annually, over 650,000 women undergo a hysterectomy, at a cost of approximately $3
billion totally." Gloria A. Bachmann, Hysterectomy: A Critical Review, 35J. REPROD. MED. 839, 839
(1990). Additionally, decreased health costs would be beneficial to women since "[w] omen and
children comprise 75% of the U.S. poverty population." No Simple Explanationfor High Rate of
Depreasion in Women, APA Task Force Finds, AM. PSYCHOL ASS'N, Dec. 5, 1990 (on file at Center
for Medical Consumers, New York, N.Y.).
24. See Schaller, supra note 14, at 1854 (discussing S. Miles & A. August, Courts, Gender, and
"The Right toDie, "18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 85, 85-90 (1990)) (explaining that women's wishes
to not be placed on life support were ignored more often than those of men).
25. Karen J. Carlson, BA. Miller & F.J. Fowler, The Maine Women's Health Study: L Outcomes
of Hysterectomy, 83 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 556, 556 (1994) (citing ROBERT POKRAS & VICKI
HUFNAGEL, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PUB. No. (PHS) 87-1753, HYSTERECTOMIES IN THE
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the two most common surgical procedures are performed exclusively
on women, and both have been criticized for being performed
unnecessarily.26 Hysterectomy is most often performed for uterine
fibroids (thirty-five percent), a benign condition.17 Almost seventy-
seven percent of all hysterectomies are performed on women between
the ages of twenty and forty-nine." There is little medical data to
support hysterectomy's efficacy29-- it is medically accepted simply
because it is done. ° There are a number of long-term after-effects
of hysterectomy, but research in this area is not comprehensive.3 '
Although the mortality rate for hysterectomy is not high, 2 it is
U.S., 1965-1984 (1987)) [hereinafter Maine Women's Health Study).
26. See Norman F. Miller, Hysterectomy: Therapeutic Necessity or Surgical Racket?, 51 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 904 (1946) (raising questions about efficacy of hysterectomy); J.C.
Doyle, Unnecessary Hysterectomies: Study of 6248 Operations in Thirty-Five Hospitals During 1948, 151
JAMA 360 (1953), cited in Steven J. Bernstein, Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Albert L. Siu, Carol P.
Roth, MarjorieJ. Sherwood,Joan W. Keesey, Jacqueline Kosecoff, Nicholas R. Hicks & Robert
H. Brook, The Appropriateness of Hysterectomy: A Comparison of Care in Seven Health Plans, 269JAMA
2398, 2398 n.3 (1993) (revealing that data from the 1950s shows hysterectomies are
unnecessarily performed);Jane E. Brody, Rate of Hysterectomy Drops, But Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1993, at C14 (referring to a RAND Corporation study of health maintenance
organizations which found that 16% of hysterectomies were "clearly unnecessary" and 25% were
of questionable necessity); Press Release from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois 1 (July 18, 1990)
(on file at Center for Medical Consumers, New York, N.Y.) (reporting that at least one-third of
hysterectomies are performed unnecessarily); Unnecessary Cesarean Sections: How to Cure a National
Epidemic (Pub. Citizen Health Res. Group, Washington, D.C.), 1989, at 1 (reporting the rate of
unnecessary cesarean sections).
27. Maine Women's Health Study, supra note 25, at 559. Abnormal bleeding is the next most
common diagnosis (22%), then chronic pelvic pain (12%), endometriosis (10%), cervical
intraepithelial neoplasia (7%), prolapse (4%), endometrial hyperplasia (1%), pelvic
inflammatory disease (1%), and other diagnoses (2%). See also Karen J. Carlson, David H.
Nichols & Isaac Schiff, Indications for Hysterectomy, 328 NEW ENG.J. MED. 856 (1993) (indicating
that uterine fibroids normally stabilize after menopause).
28. Robert Pokras, Hysterectomy: Past, Present and Future, STAT. BULL., Oct.-Dec. 1989, at 12.
29. "[T]here is little consensus concerning indications for hysterectomy." Charles L.
Easterday, DA Grimes & J.A. Riggs, Hysterectomy in the United States, 62 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 203, 210 (1983). The American College of Obstetrician and Gynecologists
("ACOG") recently recommended that hysterectomy be the:
treatment of last resort for [benign] conditions and should be performed only after
1) proper diagnostic tests have been performed to confirm the underlying condition;
2) more conservative treatments failed to improve the condition and fertility is not a
consideration for the patient; and 3) the patient has been properly counseled on the
risks and benefits of the procedure.
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, STATEMENT ON HYSTERECTOMY AND
ITS ALTERNATIVES (1994) (on file at Center for Medical Consumers, New York, N.Y.).
30. Some accuse the medical profession of accepting procedures as valid without subjecting
them to any verification of merit. See Leopold G. Koss, The Papanicolaou Test for Cervical Cancer
Detection: A Triumph and a Tragedy, 261JAMA 737 (1989) (explaining that "[t]he efficiency of the
cervical smear has never been tested in a prospective blinded study"); Screeningfor Cervical Cancer:
Room for Improvement, supra note 18, at 1 (outlining the recent standards created for laboratories
who review Pap smear tests).
31. See Indications for Hysterectomy, supra note 27 (providing an overview of this research).
32. See Indications forHysterectomy, supra note 27, at 859 (stating that death rates range "from
6 to 11 per 10,000 for indications not involving obstetrical emergency or cancer, from 29 to 38
per 10,000 when the indication is associated with pregnancy, and from 70 to 200 per 10,000
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estimated that roughly one-fourth to one-half of women who undergo
a hysterectomy develop some type of post-surgical complication.3
Research in the early 1970s first identified the symptoms of "post-
hysterectomy syndrome" as including depression, hot flashes, urinary
symptoms, fatigue, headaches, dizziness and insomnia." These
symptoms, particularly depression, affect seventy percent of hysterecto-
mized women.35 There is also the significant risk of impaired sexual
function. 6 A woman's ovaries secrete estrogen, which, in turn
lubricates the vagina and maintains hormonal balance. 7 Loss of the
ovaries through oophorectomy, a procedure occurring in thirty-six
percent of hysterectomies, can result in dryness of the vagina, making
sex painful.38 Masters and Johnson established that the cervix acts
as a trigger for orgasm and that the uterus contracts during sex, thus
the loss of either can result in decreased sexual pleasure. 9 In
addition, the uterus may serve other important health functions
unrelated to reproduction and sexuality."
Hysterectomy has generated a large amount of informed consent
litigation and some legislation as well.41 Informed consent is crucial
to the performance of hysterectomy since it is commonly prescribed
for benign conditions,42 and, therefore, its purpose is to improve a
woman's quality of life.43 The procedure, however, presents serious
risks.' Aside from the physical effects, hysterectomy can also have a
substantial psychological impact on a woman because her genitalia are
when the indication is associated with cancer").
33. Hysterectomy in the United States, supra note 29, at 203.
34. Gloria A. Bachmann, Psychosexual Aspects of Hysterectomy, WOMEN'S HEALTH INST., Fall
1990, at 41,42 (citing D.H. Richards, A Post-Hysterectomy Syndrome, 2 LANCET 983, 983-85 (1974)).
35. Richards, supra note 34, at 983 (citing D.H. Richards, Depression After Hysterectomy, 2
LANCET 430 (1973)).
36. Psychosexual Aspects of Hysterectomy, supra note 34, at 41, 44 (reporting that the
"[i]ncidence of sexual dysfunction after hysterectomy ranges from 10-46%, depending on a
number of factors, one being the removal of the ovaries").
37. Sexual Response After Hysterectomy, supra note 16, at 2.
38. Sexual Response After Hysterectomy, supra note 16, at 2.
39. WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA E.JOHNSON, HuMiAN SEXUAL RESPONSE 282-83 (1966);
see also Sexual Response After Hysterectomy, supra note 16, at 1-4 (exploring the physiological
changes in women's sexual response after hysterectomy).
40. See David A. Grimes, Shifting Indications for Hysterectomy: Nature, Nurture, or Neither?, 344
LANCET 1652, 1652 (1994) (citations omitted) (relating that several studies indicate the uterus
protects premenopausal women from heart disease, among other health problems).
41. See Rose, supra note 12; see also discussion infra section IV (discussing the New York
legislation).
42. See Maine Women's Health Study, supra note 25, at 556 (stating that "[b]enign conditions
account for approximately 90% of hysterectomies").
43. See Indications for Hysterectomy, supra note 27, at 860 (stressing that "in the case of
hysterectomy, a procedure that in most cases is performed to relieve symptoms and improve the
quality of life, the patient's preferences regarding treatment alternatives must be considered
carefully").
44. Indications for Hysterectomy, supra note 27, at 859.
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being altered. 45 In addition, a poor understanding of the proposed
surgery and what changes to expect after the operation, have been
cited as factors in postoperative sexuality problems,46 thus making
informed consent critical to a patient's post-surgery well-being.
II. THE LEGAL DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT
Informed consent is a natural manifestation of the principle of self-
governance that both American society and American courts value.47
The determination of an individual's will is put to rigorous tests in
situations where that will is not explicit. The most dramatic examples
of this are right-to-die cases and the lengths to which the courts and
state legislatures go to ascertain what a person who has become
incompetent would want.'
Initially, lack of consent claims were solely actions in battery and
applied mainly to the removal of organs without a patient's con-
sent.49 The information at stake in these cases was straightforward,
and the overriding of the patient's consent dramatic. Subsequently,
cases where patients consented but were inadequately informed
emerged and were also framed in battery.5" The reasoning was that
lack of information about a particular medical procedure nullified the
patient's consent. This proved troublesome for the courts: an action
in battery requires intent to cause harm and this was difficult to
ascribe to doctors when the issue was insufficient disclosure of
information. The pervading judicial view was that "the physician is
acting in relatively good faith for the benefit of the patient. While it
is true that in some cases the results are not in fact beneficial to a
45. PsychosexualAspects of Hysterectomy, supra note 34, at 41.
46. Bachmann, supra note 34, at 41. Hysterectomies can cause diminished levels of desire,
less frequent orgasms, sexual difficulties caused by the severing of sensory nerves, and decreased
pleasure during sexual activity. Sexual Response After Hysterectomy, supra note 16, at 2.
47. Our society has long valued privacy, personal autonomy, and free will in decision-
making. This commitment has been reflected in the works of philosophers, scholars,
and writers in many fields, and in the everyday beliefs and actions of individuals. Our
system of laws also has reflected those values. While the law does not permit all
persons to live their lives as they choose without restriction, it does, in many instances,
not only protect but facilitate individual autonomy and decisionmaking.
Jones, supra note 1, at 379-80 (citations omitted).
48. For examples of such efforts to determine the preference of a person who has lost the
capacity to express that preference, see Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
49. Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); Schloendorffv. NewYork Hosp.,
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
50. E.g., Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. 1958) (explaining that a
male patient was not informed that the procedure would entail severing of his spermatic cords,
which resulted in his sterilization).
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patient, the courts have repeatedly stated that doctors are not
insurers."
51
In the late 1950s, beginning with Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr Univ.
Bd. of Trustees, 2 the concept developed that it was a doctor's duty to
disclose sufficient information so that a patient could "form the basis
of an intelligent consent ... Informed consent claims came to
be framed in terms of negligence, in order to get away from the anti-
social connotations of "battery." The emphasis came to rest on the
disclosure of information and the scope of that disclosure: "[c] onsent
to medical treatment, to be effective, should stem from an under-
standing decision based on adequate information about the treat-
ment, the available alternatives, and the collateral risks." 4 A doctor
does not have the duty to disclose risks when there is an emergen-
cy,5 when the risk would so alarm the patient as to compromise her
health, 6 when the risk is common knowedge, 7 or, when the risk
is already known to the patient.5"
The framing of informed consent cases as actions in negligence
rather than battery, places very different burdens and disadvantages
on a plaintiff. First, "[a]s a consequence of treating an informed
consent cause of action as one in negligence, the plaintiff patient had
to prove much more than an unauthorized touching; he had to show
duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages."59 An action in
negligence will also require that the plaintiff produce evidence of the
standard of medical practice, typically in the form of expert testimo-
ny.' An action in battery, on the other hand, requires only that the
plaintiff produce evidence that the physician failed to disclose the
risks of the procedure and any alternatives.61 Second, a plaintiff's
51. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1100 (Kan. 1960).
52. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
53. Id. at 181.
54. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 556-57 (Okla. 1979).
55. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
56. Id. at 789.
57. Id. at 788.
58. Id See Stauffer v. Karabin, 492 P.2d 862 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (describing that the
physician maintained the plaintiff knew that genitourinary fistulas were a risk of hysterectomy
since her mother had the same operation which resulted in the development of a genitourinary
fistula; and therefore, the doctor maintained he had no duty to disclose this risk).
59. LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039, 1044 (La. 1983).
60. SeeSalgo v. Leland Stanford,Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)
(discussing the use of expert medical testimony to establish a negligence claim).
61. "In a battery lawsuit the failure to disclose risks and alternatives may render the consent
meaningless, and any offensive touching therefore becomes battery. In this view, expertise
becomes irrelevant, since the doctor's privilege to touch the patient ends when he or she
exceeds the scope of the patient's consent." ANNAS, supra note 22, at 85 (citation omitted).
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remedies are more limited under the theory of negligence, because
she must prove actual damages.62 The latter is not required for an
action in battery,63 and, a plaintiff may also be able to recover
punitive damages. While the courts appear to recognize that patients
suffer injuries at the hands of doctors due to lack of information, the
evolution of the legal doctrine as framed in negligence, creates an
analytic framework that favors the physician.
III. INFORMED CONSENT, HYSTERECTOMY AND THE COURTS
One commentator calls medical law in the United States "a clear
case of institutionalized paternalism."' He goes on to point out:
In the last fifty years allopathic physicians have been awarded
virtually a complete monopoly over the licensure and practice of
the healing arts .... When judges began to consider the issue of
patients' autonomy in medical decision-making, it took place in a
climate where the question of self-determination had been
neglected by law for centuries. Lawmakers had reduced patients'
personal freedom to the right of vetoing unwanted procedures and
even this veto power is not always respected.'s
Medicine's paternalism is evident in how doctors effectively usurp
women's decisionmaking powers by not disclosing information that
would impact on the women's decisions.66 Paternalism in the law is
evident in favoring a standard of disclosure that permits paternalism
within the medical profession to function unchecked.
Essentially, the problem is that any legal standard employed by the
courts will be weighted with values and with the facts of the case. The
question is whose values will be used and from whose perspective the
facts will be portrayed: "the meanings of law and fact are bound
together because judges explain the law according to their interpreta-
tions of fact, and both law and fact are framed by the culture of the
interpreters who create narratives to explain them."67 The legal
standards used in informed consent and hysterectomy cases illuminate
the clash between male-defined and female-defined values and facts.
62. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1995) (discussing the basic
elements, including damages, which must be proven for a negligence cause of action).
63. ANNAs, supra note 22, at 85.
64. Jay Katz, Informed Consent: A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 140 (1977).
65. Id. (citation omitted).
66. See generally Redford v. United States, No. 89-2324, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4712 at *1
(D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1992) (holding physicians liable for failing to inform a patient that she had
other alternatives and that it was not medically necessary to undergo surgery).
67. JANICE SCHUETZ, THE LOGIC OF WOMEN ON TRIAL: CASE STUDIES OF POPULAR AMERICAN
TIALS 144 (1994) (citation omitted).
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Hysterectomy is usually an elective procedure performed to improve
a woman's quality of life; litigation typically arises out of inadequate
disclosure of risks and inadequate disclosure of alternative treatments.
In court, a patient will have to show that the harms she suffered were
material risks that the doctor was under a duty to disclose, and that
if she had been advised of these risks, which resulted in injury, she
would not have had the procedure.
A. Failure to Disclose Risks
Liability can ensue when a doctor fails to inform a woman of the
possible risks of undergoing a hysterectomy. In these cases, the
courts must grapple With how much information is enough and what
constitutes a risk of which a patient should be informed. Risks are
disclosed according to either of two standards: the professional
practice standard, which focuses on what is common practice for
physicians to disclose, and the reasonable person standard, which
focuses on what a reasonable patient would want to know.69 The
professional practice standard is favored by the majority of jurisdic-
tions.
1. Professional Practice Standard
Under the professional practice standard, a doctor has a duty to
inform the patient only of material risks that are generally disclosed
as standard medical practice.7" For example, if it is not standard
medical practice to reveal that some women experience sexual
dysfunction after a hysterectomy,71 then a doctor would not be liable
for failing to disclose that fact.
72
The professional practice standard is problematic because doctors
have control over it, which gives them the opportunity to insulate
themselves from liability.7' Not only that, but new research would
68. The courts have held physicians liable for not disclosing the risks or effects of a
hysterectomy. Niccoli v. Thompson, 713 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Smith v. Reisig, M.D.,
Inc., 686 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1984); LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983).
69. This standard for risk disclosure is rarely used. E.g., Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp.
503 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd without op., 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974) (using the reasonable person
standard to determine liability). Women's own evidence as to their preferences rarely carries
much authority and is treated as suspect because it is viewed as "hindsight." See LaCaze, 434 So.
2d at 1049 (refraining from the use of a subjective standard to find liability).
70. See Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 507 (NJ. 1988) (discussing material risks and
scope of disclosure under the professional practice standard).
71. Supra note 36 and accompanying text.
72. E.g., Largey, 540 A.2d at 507.
73. See id. at 508-09 (stating that under the professional practice standard physicians are
vested with nearly unlimited discretion when determining how much information to disclose).
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only be included once it has been incorporated into practice.74 The
professional practice standard does not afford sufficient protection to
the patient, nor does it encourage doctors to educate themselves on
new developments. The standard is based on faith in doctors'
authority and knowledge. 75
The professional practice standard further permits domination of
the definitions within the standard by allowing doctors to control the
definition of a "material" risk. Defining "material" can be enigmatic
within the legal system since what is "material" to a woman may not
be to an institution working with male-defined values.
Whether a risk is "material" depends on its severity and its
probability of occurring.7' Doctors have control over the definition
of "material" because they are allowed to give anecdotal evidence as
to the frequency of a risk's occurrence. 77 In Riedisser v. Nelson,78 for
example, no statistics were quoted aside from the defendant-doctor's
testimony as to the incidence of fistulas. 79  The defendant-doctor
testified on his own behalf regarding the incidence of genitourinary
fistulas,8 0 stating that he had performed almost one thousand
hysterectomies and "this is the first time a ureterovaginal fistula has
occurred."81
Even if there is a low probability of a particular risk, this will be
balanced against its severity. Genitourinary fistulas are a continual
source of litigation: 2 "[a] genitourinary fistula, with its constant,
74. Id. at 507.
75. Id (explaining that all formulations of the professional practice standard are based
upon "the belief that a physician and only a physician, can effectively estimate the physical and
psychological consequences that a risk inherent in a medical procedure might produce in a
patient").
76. Longmire v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
77. In Longmire v. Hoey, the defendant doctor testified that he did not inform his patient
of the risk of a ureterovaginal fistula because it was the first time one had occurred in the over
3,000 hysterectomies he performed, despite the fact that he admitted the incidence of fistulas
is estimated at 1 - 12% according to medical data. Id. at 309.
78. 534 P.2d 1052 (Ariz. 1975).
79. Id. at 1054; see also LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039, 1047 (La. 1983) (supporting the
position that a defendant doctor can give his own testimony on the incidence of fistulas).
80. A genitourinary fistula is an abnormal tubelike passage from a normal cavity or tube in
the genital or urinary organs to another cavity or a free surface. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICrIONARY 735, 794 (17th ed. 1993).
81. Riedisse, 534 P.2d at 1054.
82. For examples of litigation where hysterectomized women complained of genitourinary
fistulas, see the following cases: Doyle v. Shubs, 905 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990);Jimenez v. Heyliger
Seguros Triple S, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 910 (D.P.R. 1992); Steinhagen v. U.S., 768 F. Supp. 200(E.D. Mich. 1991); Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Riedisser v. Nelson, 534
P.2d 1052 (Ariz. 1975); Taylor v. Riddell, 896 S.W.2d 891 (Ark. 1995); Stauffer v. Karabin, 492
P.2d 862 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Conley v. Gallup, 445 S.E.2d 275 (Ga. CL App. 1994); Tatro v.
Lueken, 512 P.2d 529 (Kan. 1973); LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983); Roberson v.
Menorah Medical Ctr., 588 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Smith v. Reisig, M.D., Inc., 686 P.2d
285 (Okla. 1984); Longmire v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
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odorous, scalding, unimpeded leakage of urine, is one of the most
devastating surgical complications that can occur in women."83 Yet,
women are repeatedly told in court that a fistula is not a severe
risk. 4 In examining the severity of genitourinary fistulas in Longmire
v. Hoey, the court was of the opinion that a serious risk was one "of a
devastating nature; such as complete or partial paralyses, blindness or
deafness."'t A genitourinary fistula did not, in the court's view, fall
into that category.
The professional practice standard has been interpreted by at least
one court to be what a reasonable person in the doctor's position
would tell a patient.8 Ajury could, therefore, find that a reasonable
doctor would be informed on current research about women's sexual
response or on the functions of the ovaries so that doctors will be
held accountable for staying abreast of changing medical knowledge.
This re-phrasing of the standard gives the medical profession an
incentive to think about a patient's needs.
B. Failure to Disclose Alternatives
Doctors can be liable if they fail to adequately disclose alternative
treatments.8 7 There is usually at least one alternative to a hysterecto-
my: no treatment. A hysterectomy is primarily an elective surgery that
in the majority of cases is performed not out of medical necessity, but
to improve the woman's quality of life.'u Therefore, it is crucial to
disclose alternative methods of treatment.
1. Professional Practice Standard
For a woman to have a successful claim based on failure to disclose
alternatives, she must show that there is a medically accepted
alternative treatment for her condition. 9 Since hysterectomies are
83. Raymond A. Lee, Richard E. Symmonds & Tiffany J. Williams, Current Status of
Genitouinary Fistula, 72 OSTRiCS & GYNEOLOGY 313 (1988) (stating that the leakage is into
the vagina).84. E.g.. Baker v. Moore, slip op. (Tenn. Ct. App.June 25, 1980) (explaining that the failure
to warn of the possible development of a fistula after a hysterectomy does not invalidate
consent); Longmire, 512 S.W.2d at 310 (stating the court's opinion that the defendant's failure
to disclose the risk of a fistula was not a risk of such a material nature as to invalidate the
consent previously given by the patient).
85. Longmire, 512 S.W.2d at 310.
86. Redford v. United States, No. 89-2324, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4712 at *36 (D.D.C. Apr.
10, 1992).
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (explaining that in the majority of cases
hysterectomies are not medically required, but performed to improve the woman's quality of life
by reducing abdominal pain and excessive menstrual bleeding).
89. See, eg., Steele v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 371 So. 2d 843, 849 (La. Ct. App.
1979) (discussing the doctor's duty to inform a patient of alternative procedures unless the
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medically acceptable only because doctors perform them,9" the result
is that alternatives may be held to a higher standard than the
procedure which is the focus of litigation. In practice, the common
pitfall of the standard is that doctors are again controlling the
definitions.
In Steele v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,9 the court acknowl-
edged that under the professional practice standard, "performing a
hysterectomy on a woman with Mrs. Steele's history is a very prudent
course."92 Nevertheless, the court found that while "having a
hysterectomy was prudent, and possibly the wisest course, it was not
absolute [ly] dictated. There was an acceptable alternative."" Steele
was not in "demonstrable danger" and was still entitled to exercise her
right to decide for herself.94 The court then addressed whether
there was an acceptable alternative medical treatment to hysterecto-
my-this was established through physician testimony." While the
result was favorable for this plaintiff, reliance on physician testimony
in lieu of medical data is dangerous because such a method of proof
does not ensure consistent justice for hysterectomized women.96
C. Proximate Cause
In order for a patient to recover for negligence, she must prove
that the doctor's breach of his duty to disclose information was the
proximate cause of damage to her.97 In the context of informed
consent, this means that the patient must show that a reasonable
person, informed of the potential risks, would not have opted for the
surgery, and but for this lack of information, she was injured. While
the element of disclosure usually must meet the professional practice
standard, the element of proximate cause must meet the reasonable
person standard.
patient is already aware of the alternatives).
90. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (explaining that there is little evidence
supporting the efficacy of a hysterectomy, but that it has earned status as an acceptable
treatment because it is performed frequently).
91. 371 So. 2d 843 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
92. Id. at 847.
93. Id.
94. Id
95. Id. at 849.
96. See, e.g., Thornton v. Annest, 574 P.2d 1199 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting a woman's
claim on the basis of physician testimony).
97. See Dorothea Beane, AIDS risis and the Health Care Community: Public Concerns Triggering
Questionable Pivate Rights ofAction for Emotional Harms and Legislative Response 45 MERCER L. REV.
633, 660 (1994) (stating that in order to recover in a negligence case for malpractice, the
physician's failure to disclose information must have proximately caused the plaintiffs injury).
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1. Reasonable Person Standard
"I concur with the majority opinion in all respects except I would
adopt the reasonable man test set out in Canterbury v. Spence.""8 The
reasonable person standard is supposedly reflective of what would
affect the decision of a reasonable patient. As evidenced in the above
quote, all too frequently that reasonable person is a male. A gender-
neutral standard should theoretically serve women, but the courts
operate under powerful societal stereotypes. 99
In informed consent cases, the legal standard requires that the jury
put themselves in the position of the woman patient and assess what
she would have wanted to know-even though she is present and
capable of saying what she wanted to know. The landmark case in
this area is Canterbury v. Spence.' The court in Canterbury cited the
value of self-determination as underlying its decision to apply the
reasonable person standard: "[t]he root premise is the concept,
fundamental in American jurisprudence, that 'every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body .... 101
The issue of whether the surgery was the proximate cause of any
damage exemplifies how the values ascribed to the reasonable male
person are not necessarily consonant with the values of the reasonable
female person. Proximate cause also exemplifies how the principle
of self-determination is compromised. For ajury to put themselves in
the position of another person is difficult; it is a somewhat pointless
exercise when that person is present. It should not be so difficult to
answer the question of whether a patient would have had the
98. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 560 (Okla. 1979) (citations omitted) (Barnes, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (emphasis added). The procedure in question was
a hysterectomy.
99. See generaly Karen Zpanskiy, Domestic Volence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons
from Studies on Genkr Bias in the Courts, 27 FANI. L. Q. 247 (1993) (discussing gender stereotypes
in the court system).
100. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
101. Id. at 780 (quotingJudge Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105
N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
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procedure had she been informed of the risks,"°2 and when the
person is present, it simply does not have to be so difficult.
A promising decision in the areas of proximate cause and damages
is Redford v. United States.13 Redford was having difficulty becoming
pregnant and was also experiencing some pain in her lower abdo-
men."4 She was diagnosed with pelvic adhesions and endometrio-
sis,x°" and a hysterectomy was prescribed. After the surgery, Redford
had headaches so severe that she had to go to the emergency room
six times. 06 At the time of the court case, she was had undergone
a profound personality change and was in a major depression,10 7 as
well as was experiencing a host of other problems.0 8 Redford was
never informed of any risks of the procedure or any alternative
treatments except Danazol, which she was reluctant to take because
she was afraid it would lower her voice."' The court decided that
Redford was prescribed an extreme treatment,"0 about which she
102. The uterus is not free floating in the pelvis. It is attached to four broad bands of
ligaments, including the uterosacral ligaments, which attach, to the sacrum in the lower
back. The uterus is also attached to a major blood supply, and a large bundle of
nerves. When the ligaments that attach to the uterus are severed, they are then
hanging at one end.., no longer to attach to anything. Those are the supporting
ligaments for the entire pelvic structure. When those ligaments are severed, it permits
the pelvis to broaden and widen .... When the blood supply to the uterus is severed
you lose much of the sensation, and many women lose all sensation to the vagina,
clitoris, and nipples .... Many women also have at the site at which the nerves were
severed, chronic pain and inflammation of the nerve endings .... Your vagina will
be shortened .... The uterus and cervix are removed through the vagina, and the top
of the vagina is sutured shut and sutured to one of the hanging ligaments, thus the
vagina becomes like a closed pocket, with a loss of elasticity, and with a scar at the top
of the vagina ... everything in the abdomen and pelvis drifts down into the area
previously occupied by the uterus, displacing all of the remaining organs.
An Introduction to Hysterectomy: The Operation and Its Life-Long Consequences, HERS NEWSL.
(Hysterectomy Educ. Resources & Services, Bala Cynwyd, Pa.), 1993, at 2-3.
103. No. 89-2324, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4712 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1992).
104. Id. at *5.
105. "Endometriosis is a condition through which the tissue that lines the cavity of the uterus
is found in implants outside of the uterus." Id.
106. Id. at *26.
107. Id.
Mr. Redford also explained that while before the surgery his wife was a "very happy
person" who was "a lot of fun to be around," she has changed fundamentally since: "it
is hard to deal with someone who doesn't knowjoy... this is not the same person that
I was with prior to this. She just is not the same person."
Id. at *27.
108. Redford v. United States, No. 89-2324, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4712, *23 (D.D.C. Apr,
10, 1992) (including her inability to conceive and lack of interest in sexual relations with her
husband).
109. Id. at *12.
110. Redford's reason for going to the doctor was that she was having difficulty conceiving.
Her diagnoses were pelvic adhesions and endometriosis. "First, she was not told that one option
would have been to do nothing. Neither the endometriosis or the pelvic adhesions, of which
the doctors presumed Redford suffered, required treatment." Id. at *34 (citations omitted).
Also, pregnancy is "considered the best cure for endometriosis .... " Id. The doctors had
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was poorly informed. When the pain sought to be cured is minimal,
a reasonable person would not run the risk of such severe after-effects
to rid herself of pain that has no substantial impact on her daily life.
The reasoning in this decision delves more deeply into a woman's
point-of-view than earlier cases. The traditional analysis is that surgery
confers a benefit, and this is measured against any discernible damage
suffered by the patient. Despite the court's finding that the hysterec-
tomy was successful in that it cured Mrs. Redford's pain,' this was
a minimal benefit which was outweighed by her loss of ability to
conceive.12 Redford nonetheless signals a favorable departure from
earlier cases," 3 where defendant doctors were not held liable if the
surgery was successful.
W. LEGISLATION ADDRESSING INFORMED CONSENT: DOES IT WORK?
There is evidence that informed consent can decrease the rate of
unnecessary hysterectomies." 4 To that end, New York enacted
legislation aimed at informing women about hysterectomy proce-
dures."' The statute calls for the Commissioner of the New York
State Department of Health to develop a standardized written
summary detailing the procedure, 1 6 in consultation with the New
York medical society, consumers, and others knowledgeable about the
hysterectomy procedure."7 This summary is made available at no
cost to clinics, health maintenance organizations, hospitals and
doctors' offices, for distribution by a physician to each individual
considering a hysterectomy."8
The summary was written in consultation with the New York State
Medical Society and other representatives of the medical profession,
notably the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
("ACOG"), the Nurses' Association of ACOG, and the American
focused on Redford's pelvic pain but the pain had "a minimal impact on her daily activities."
Id at *18.
111. Redford, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *40.
112. Id. at *40-41.
113. E.g., Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Mathis v. Cowles, 772 P.2d
827 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
114. G. Domenighetti, P. Luraschi, A. Casabianca, F. Gutzwiller, A. Spinelli, E. Pedrinis &
F. Repetto, Effects of Information Campaign by the Mass Media on Hysterectomy Rates, 1437 LANcEr
1470 (1988).
115. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2495 (McKinney 1993).
116. Id at § 2496 (stating that the written summary should explain common conditions that
hysterectomy is prescribed to treat, accepted alternative medical treatments for such conditions,
the various types of hysterectomy, the risks, the benefits, physiological changes, and side effects
associated with both hysterectomy and alternative medical treatments).
117. Id at § 2497.
118. Id at § 2498.
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Medical Association. There was only one consumer representative" 9
despite the statutory language indicating more than one. 2 A
pediatrician was selected to write the pamphlet.
12
There were conflicts regarding what information should be
included during the drafting process. The doctors had particular
trouble viewing the gynecological system as having purposes other
than reproduction, such as sexuality. 22  Ultimately, the doctors
capitulated on two points: that hysterectomy can adversely impact the
function of the ovaries and sexual response, and, that there is the
possibility that ovarian cancer can develop even though the ovaries
have been removed. 2  This information was included in the final
version of the summary, albeit in a diluted form.
1 24
The New York statute is further weakened by imposing no legal
liability: nothing in the statute may "be construed to create a cause of
action for lack of informed consent."" The multi-lingual summa-
ries can be obtained by calling the New York State Department of
Health. They may be available in clinics, hospitals and doctors'
offices, but there is no legal obligation to give the summaries to
women considering a hysterectomy.
126
Legislation is an option for addressing informed consent, but in the
case of New York it does not seem to be effective. The State cannot
be present at every patient-doctor encounter to ensure the patient is
informed. Therefore, giving an under-informed patient a cause of
action would have given this legislation some strength. The result in
New York is merely a suggestion for behavior, in the form of a very
expensive health education pamphlet. If the summary had been
written by health educators, rather than doctors, the campaign would
have been less expensive and, in the consumer representative's
opinion, more truthful. 2
7
119. Interview with Mayann Napoli, Associate Director, Center for Medical Consumers, New
York, N.Y. (Nov. 22, 1993) (hereinafter Interview with Maryann Napoli] (discussing how Napoli
was the sole consumer representative who provided information and input on the process of
writing the summary).
120. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2496 (McKinney 1993).
121. Interview with Maryann Napoli, supra note 119.
122. Interview with Maryann Napoli, supra note 119.
123. Interview with Maryann Napoli, supra note 119; N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH,
HYSTERECrOmy (1991) [hereinafter HYSTERECTOMY].
124. HYsTERECrOmY, supra note 123, at 8-9 (discussing ovarian function and ovarian cancer)
and 9-10 (discussing sexuality).
125. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2499 (McKinney 1993).
126. Id. at § 2498.
127. Interview with Maryann Napoli, supra note 119.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Informed consent should be a natural part of the intimate
relationship between patient and doctor, but this is a difficult
relationship to legislate or adjudicate. This is a relationship that, in
the case of women and hysterectomy, is fraught with debilitating
stereotypes that pose obstacles to women's equitable treatment.
Informed consent as a legal doctrine only catches those patients who
have had adverse outcomes-but how do we help patients before they
are harmed? The legal system cannot be the sole solution to
negotiating the patient-doctor relationship to a more equal level.
A. Fundamental Changes in the Patient-Doctor Relationship
The medical profession must make some basic changes. One
change should be the incorporation into medical education of the
concept of the patient, especially the woman patient, as peer. Doctors
need to be met partway on this issue. A fundamental change must
come from the women's community as well. There should be a
concerted effort on the grassroots level to develop an active voice and
to disavow passivity. Within the women's community, there must be
recognition of the tendency for some to advocate for others who
remain silenced.
B. Health Policy and Enforcement
The addition of a counseling component' 2 8 to the health care
continuum serves as a mechanism for informing the consumer. For
example, human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") counseling and
abortion counseling are components of health care for specific health
issues. Like HIV and abortion counseling, hysterectomy counseling
could ensure that the patient understands her condition, the
procedure and alternative treatments, and that she made an informed
decision concerning which course of treatment to pursue. Counseling
cannot be implemented to achieve informed consent for all proce-
dures and tests, but controversial procedures can be identified, such
as hysterectomy, where there are abuses. Counseling can be done by
a doctor or, to free up a doctor's time and cut costs, a nurse
practitioner or some other level of health care worker.
128. Interview with Arthur Levin, Executive Director, Center for Medical Consumers, New
York, N.Y. (Dec. 14, 1993) (proposing the inclusion of a hysterectomy counseling component
to facilitate informed consent).
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Enforcement of informed consent mechanisms seems to have the
most promise if tied to reimbursement. 2 9 Linking reimbursement
to informed consent would compensate for injury without having to
turn to the courts. A patient would be compensated by a financial
penalty levied, without being required to satisfy the requirements of
causation and injury. These requirements make sense because they
weed out litigation and reserve the judiciary for more "serious" cases,
where people have been severely injured, but there can be damage to
a patient that may not qualify in the legal sense. It is not desirable to
permit doctors to impair women's function to any degree without
punity.
C. Changes in Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent
1. Legal Profession's Impact on Legal Thought
Like the medical profession, the legal profession also subscribes to
stereotypes about women, and remains just as gender biased.' The
legal profession must make some profound changes in the current
legal education, which is generally lacking in women's perspectives,
as well as the viewpoints of those who are not members of the
dominant culture.3 Law students will become lawyers and judges,
and will have to represent or adjudicate the cases of a diverse group
of people. The incorporation of diverse perspectives should be an
integral part of any legal education.
129. SeeMarshall Kapp, EnforcingPatient Preferences: LinkingPaymentforMedical Care to Informed
Consent, 261 JAMA 1935, 1936 (1989) (asserting that mechanisms already in place, such as peer
review organizations, can incorporate the documentation of valid informed consent-or the
presence of a recognized exception to informed consent-into patients' medical records).
130. See Mary Voboril, Survey: Women Lauyers Face Harassment, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 13, 1993
(asserting that sexual harassment persists in law firms despite policies discouraging it); Hon.
Judith S. Kaye, Women Layers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Towards Gender Equality, 57
FORDHAM L REVIEW 111, 119 (1988) (reporting that an American BarAssociation ("ABA") study
shows that women are not rising to the highest positions in the legal profession and gender bias
against them persists); Marilyn Elias, Unjust SalariesforFemaleLawyers, USATODAY, Aug. 31, 1993,
at 1D (reporting that a field study based on 884 lawyers who graduated from the University of
Michigan revealed thatwomen earned overall 61% ofwhat the men earned and also that women
lawyers' paychecks would be 15% higher if there were no sex discrimination).
131. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Perspectives on the Ideological Impact of Legal Education
Upon the Profession, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1259 (1994) (asserting that gender ideologies persist in legal
education and in the legal profession); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives
On Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1993) (asserting that values traditionally associated
with women have been marginalized by legal education); Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the
Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 41, 43 (1989) (asserting
that gender issues should be incorporated into legal education to move beyond society's
tendency to trivialize women by categorizing them as "different" or "special").
354 [Vol. 4:335
EQUAL EXERCISE OF AUTONOMY
2. Self-Determination as a Legally Protected Interest
Tort doctrine is shaped by society's values and changing needs. 32
Medicine has demonstrated an encroachment on the self-determina-
tion of one gender 3' and the law should respond accordingly.
Patient autonomy has not yet been recognized by courts as a
distinct and independent legally protected interest. If so recog-
nized, the invasion of this interest would require compensation
regardless of whether actual bodily injury occurred. Instead,
patient autonomy is [currently] protected indirectly through the
protection of tvo other interests: bodily security and bodily well-
being.13 4
Patient autonomy is taken for granted in an analytic framework
informed by male values because male autonomy is respected: s'
bodily integrity is the interest that has been identified as needing
protection. But, in an analytic framework defined by female values
where autonomy is not taken for granted, self-determination is
definitely an interest that requires protection. With a legally
protected interest of self-determination, the failure of a physician to
inform a patient, thus constraining her from exercising her autonomy,
is a compensable injury.136
3. Disclosure: The Reasonable Woman Standard
In the context of hysterectomy, a reasonable woman standard is
preferable to the professional practice standard because it puts more
emphasis on the patient's choice. The professional practice standard
subverts the purpose of informed consent: it permits the doctor to
substitute his judgment for that of the woman patient and frustrates
her self-determination.
132. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 5, at 3 (citing WILLiAM PROSSER, HAMDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 14-15 (4th ed. 1971) (citations omitted)) (asserting that tort law is not value-free
and that it evolves with society as social, cultural, economic, political and technological
conditions change).
133. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 5, at 70-74 (asserting that gender power inequalities are
indicated by medical professionals lack of concern about potential ramifications for invading the
autonomy of women patients and also by the fact that male patients were infrequently injured
by medical practitioners in a gender specific way, unlike female patients).
134. Douglas Sharrott, Note, Provider-Specific Quali,-of-Care Data: A Proposal for Limited
Mandatory Disclosure, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 85, 86 (1992).
135. See Schaller, supra note 14, at 1854-55 (asserting that a glass ceiling exists in academic
medicine partially because sexual stereotypes persist and men are more comfortable in
professional relationships with other men).
136. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Proteated Interest,
95 YALE LJ. 219, 276-98 (1985). See also Katz, supra note 64, at 161 n.76 (equating the denial of
self autonomy with injury).
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The reasonable woman in this standard should look more like the
reasonable woman in State v. Wanrow37 than in Bowers v. Gar-
fields which amounted to nothing more than a reasonable person
standard. In Wanrow, a woman's response to a perceived threat of
violence was assessed in light of women's victimization and women's
perception that self-defense requires greater force than what a man
may perceive he needs to exert.139  A reasonable woman in an
informed consent case should be assessed in the context of the
medical profession's treatment of women: a reasonable woman
arguably needs full disclosure of risks and alternatives since the
medical profession has evidenced a pattern of treatment of women as
a class of people."4 A reasonable woman standard would, therefore,
challenge the commonly-held stereotypes that medicine and law
perpetuate. 1
41
4. Proximate Cause: The Subjective Standard
The principle of self-determination is undermined by not assessing
whether the plaintiff-patient herself would have undergone a
hysterectomy had she known the risks. The current practice of
employing a reasonable person standard is entirely too vague and
elusive. The question properly is what this patient would have done.
The argument against a subjective standard for proximate cause is
that it puts "the physician at the mercy of the patient's hindsight,
anger, and resentment." This obstacle, however, is resolved by
the plaintiff's own testimony and credibility. The defendant has
sufficient opportunity to question the plaintiff's motivations during
cross-examination. 1
43
137. 559 P.2d 548, 550-51 (Wash. 1977). Yvonne Wanrowwas charged with murdering a man
suspected of being a child molester. She said she acted in self-defense because she believed
herself and the children in the house to be in danger. The court held that the objective self-
defense standard instruction was erroneous and violated equal protection.
138. 382 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (stating that the proper standard for informed consent
is whether a reasonable woman, informed of the risks, would proceed with the hysterectomy;
and, refusal to admit learned treatise for impeachment of the doctor defendant was harmless
error); see also Dessi v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 722, 729 (E.D. Va. 1980) (stating that the
prudent person standard is appropriate).
139. Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 558-59.
140. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
141. See Michael Dowd, Battered Women: A Perspective on Injustice, 1 GARDOZO WOMEN'S LJ. 1,
43-45 (1993) (advocating the use of a reasonable woman standard in domestic violence cases to
correct a gender bias in the legal system that results in injustice for women); see also Koenig &
Rustad, supra note 5, at 72 (discussing gender bias and informed consent in the hysterectomy
context); Kaye, supra note 130, at 119 (discussing gender biases in the law).
142. FADEN, BEAUcHAMP & KING, supra note 2, at 34.
143. FADEN, BEAuCHAMp & KING, supra note 2, at 35.
356 [Vol. 4:335
Spring 1996] EQUAL EXERCISE OF AUTONOMY
The mythology attached to women and women's gynecological
systems" 4 is so powerful that new ways of re-defining these symbols
must be examined. Chiefly, the mythology is that a woman's
gynecological system is ascribed value inasmuch as it relates to
reproduction. 4  Otherwise, a woman's gynecological system is
viewed negatively: as a site for possible cancer4 or an inconve-
nience. 47  The reasonable woman standard for the scope of
disclosure and the subjective standard for the element of proximate
cause begin to address how women may achieve equity under the law.
Women may want equality in the sense of having the same power and
the same value. Women may not, however, want equality, in the sense
of "sameness," from the law. Equal treatment will not serve women
at this juncture (and maybe never) primarily because women, with a
different status in society, have fundamentally different experiences
than men. Women need equity from the law, and to that end women
should advocate the use of the reasonable woman standard for
disclosure and the subjective standard for proximate cause.
CONCLUSION
Informed consent has a number of potential benefits: increased
health status and well-being, decreased health care costs, a legitimate
144. See also EDMUND I. NOVAK, GEORGEANNA SEEGAR JONES & HOWARD W. JONES, JR.,
NOVAK'S TEXTBOOK OF GYNECOLOGY 752 (9th ed. 1975) (illustrating how myths about women
and women's sexuality abound and are accepted as rational bases for medical decision-making
through the statement: "[1ack of consideration for the male partner's inherent physical drive
is a common cause of impotence and reflects an immature attitude of the female who is using
her partner for self-gratification"). See generally Ikemoto, supra note 7 (including race and class
in the analysis, as well as gender).
145. The values that inform the medical decision to hysterectomize women are based on the
conception of the uterus as having a purely reproductive function. See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, UNDERSTANDING HYSTERE-TOMY (on file at the American
University Journal of Gender & the Law) (1987) (stating that the uterus serves two functions:
carrying and nourishing a baby from conception until birth and facilitating childbirth); see also
Hysterectomy: A Critical Review, supra note 23, at 845 (quoting R.C. Wright, Hysterectomy: Past,
Present andFuture, 134 OBSTETRIcS & GYNECOLOGY 431 (1969)) (stating that elective hysterectomy
was advocated by some to eliminate the inconvenience of secretions, the potential for benign
and malignant pelvic disease, the risk of unwanted pregnancy and the presence of various pelvic
symptoms. It was also recommended by Dr. R.C. Wright after the last intentional pregnancy
because, having served its only functions, "the uterus becomes a useless, bleeding, symptom-
producing, potentially cancer-bearing organ and therefore should be removed.").
146. Indications for Hysterectomy, supra note 27, at 859.
147. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES AND PRAcrICE OF CLINICAL GYNECOLOGY 963 (Nathan G. Kase &
Allan B. Weingold eds., 1983) (describing menstruation as a bothersome condition); NOVAK,
JONES &JONES, supra note 144, at 113 (describing menstruation as "a nuisance to most women
and if this can be abolished without impairing ovarian function, it would probably be a blessing
not only to the woman but to her husband"). But see Natalie Angier, Radical New Niew of Role of
Menstruation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, at C1 (reflecting a different view as women scientists
impact on research, and, asserting that menstruation protects the uterus and fallopian tubes
from infection).
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protection for doctors from malpractice and increased patient
empowerment. 48
Hysterectomy is performed unnecessarily at an alarming rate.
149
A 1986 study on the effects of public information campaigns on
hysterectomy rates found the rates went down substantially in areas
with public information campaigns (as much as 25.8%) but rose
slightly in the area with no such campaign.5 0 Informed consent
can have a substantial impact on the hysterectomy rate in this country.
Women's health presumably would be improved by reduced subjec-
tion to an unnecessary, invasive procedure and by the reduced risk of
suffering the after-effects of a hysterectomy.
Informed consent could be an efficient way to bring down rising
health care costs. As the nation addresses the health care crisis and
how to pay for it, the first procedures to target would be those that
are performed unnecessarily. Unnecessary surgeries inflate the cost
of health care, and if they are procedures to which patients would not
agree if properly informed, then presumably the costs of health care
would decrease. Elimination of unnecessary procedures by patient
choice is preferable to intervention by an outside body, such as a
national health board or an insurance company. In this way, the
decision is driven by the individual and not by a policy-making body,
which can lose sight of individual needs and idiosyncrasies.
Doctors could benefit from informed consent as well. An angry
patient is more likely to sue, 1' and patients get angry when they are
not fully informed about what to expect from surgery. Malpractice is
a valid concern and informed consent could protect the patient from
adverse outcomes from surgery while also providing the doctor with
protection from lawsuits.
Informed consent is crucial to additional patient power. A patient
should not only be given the information necessary to be a party to
decisions about her care, but also the information necessary to have
a position of equality with her doctor."2 Instead of being acted
upon, women would make their own decisions about what is best for
them and would achieve, in addition to increased happiness and
148. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
150. Domenighetti, supra note 114, at 1470.
151. Michaeljustin Myers, Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice 55 CAL. L. REV. 1396,
1418 n.131 (1967); see Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Comparing Medical Providers: A First
Look at the New Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOL L. REv. 5, 11 (1992) (suggesting that informed
consent may decrease the likelihood of medical malpractice lawsuits).
152. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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physical well-being, a greater measure of autonomy than they
previously have been accorded.

